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Abstract
This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel
of Hungarian rms during the transition period (1989-1999). We ex-
amine the role of nancial factors and assess whether nancial reforms
have succeeded in increasing the eciency of credit allocation. We nd
that reforms have hardened budget constraints of small private rms,
and reduced informational problems for foreign rms. Small state-
owned rms became more sensitive to nancial conditions, whereas
large state-owned rms were largely unaected and kept operating
under a soft budget constraint.
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One of the key issues in the transition process of formerly centrally planned
economies is the establishment of a functioning nancial system that allows
an ecient allocation of credit. This requires designing institutions and rules
to impose nancial discipline on rms that in the old system were generally
subject to a soft budget constraint, due to the fact that loss-making rms
could rely on external assistance by means of direct subsidies, favorable tax
conditions, or bail-out credits.1.
In the past two decades the Hungarian nancial system has undergone a
number of major changes in order to increase its eciency (see e.g. Halpern
and Wyplosz, 1998, Stephan, 1999, Colombo and Drill, 2003). In particu-
lar, the banking sector reform was aimed at the separation of central bank-
ing and commercial banking functions, the restructuring of commercial banks
and the denition of an appropriate regulatory framework. At the same time,
the introduction of a new bankruptcy law was intended to enhance allocative
eciency and to provide agents with the appropriate incentives.
Institutional reforms per se, however, are not a sucient condition for the
achievement of an ecient credit allocation system. Once the new rules are
created, agents have to learn to play by the rules. In particular, in transition
economies, lenders have to develop project appraisal and monitoring skills,
while borrowers must learn to respond appropriately to the new system of
incentives. Whether the reform process in transition economies has succeeded
in establishing an ecient incentive-based economic system is an open and
much-debated issue (for the Hungarian economy see e.g. Bonin and Schaer,
1995, Halpern and K or osi, 2000, Colombo, 2001).
The objective of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent re-
forms to the Hungarian nancial system have been successful in increasing its
eciency. We investigate the investment behavior of a large panel of Hun-
garian manufacturing rms between 1989 and 1999, and examine whether
the institutional and regulatory changes have succeeded in imposing a hard
budget constraint, an issue that has been recently addressed by a number of
1Under a soft budget constraint, \[...] the nancial position of the state-owned rm is
not without in
uence. Although there is a budget constraint that forces some nancial
discipline on the rm, it is not strictly binding, but can be \stretched" at the will of the
higher authorities. In principle, the rm should cover expenditures from revenues made
on the market. In practice, earnings from the market can be arbitrarily supplemented by
external assistance." (Kornai, 2000, p.25). See also Kornai (1980, 1986)
2studies for dierent transition economies (L zal and Svejnar, 2002, Budina
et al., 2000, Bratkowski et al., 2000, Volchova, 2003, Maurel, 2001, Sgard,
2001).
Our study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. It is
the rst analysis of the role of nancial factors for investment decisions based
on a comprehensive rm-level panel data set for the Hungarian economy. In
addition, the long time period covered by the data set we analyze allows us
to compare rms' investment behavior before and after the introduction of
major nancial reforms. We can therefore provide evidence not only on the
extent to which rms face a soft budget constraint, but also on whether -
nancial system reforms have aected the degree of rationing or softness of the
budget constraint. Finally, we provide evidence on investment behavior by
ownership, analyzing individually state-owned, private domestic and foreign
owned rms.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. The role of nancial
factors for investment decisions has changed signicantly after the introduc-
tion of nancial reforms, and rms were aected dierently depending on
their ownership type. In the post-reform period, small private rms came to
face binding nancial constraints, whereas state rms kept facing a soft bud-
get constraint, although the investment decisions of small state rms became
more sensitive to nancial conditions. Foreign-owned rms were subject to
a hard budget constraint in both periods, but became less sensitive to nan-
cial conditions after 1993, possibly indicating that reforms might have been
successful in lowering informational costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brie
y
describes the theoretical background, discussing the role of nancial factors
and informational asymmetries for investment decision, and the dierent
role they play in market and transition economies. Section 3 reviews the
main steps of the reform of the Hungarian nancial system. Sections 4 and
5 describe the data set and the econometric methodology, while section 6
presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes with the
main implications of the analysis.
32 Credit rationing, soft budget constraints
and investment decisions
Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), neoclassical theoretical analyzes of
the determinants of investment decisions generally abstracted from the role
of rms' nancial positions. More recently, however, the economics of asym-
metric information has provided solid microeconomic foundations for the
role of nancial factors in determining investment levels. In the presence
of informational asymmetries, the availability of internal funds allows rms
to undertake investment projects without resorting to high-cost external -
nance. In addition, stronger balance sheet positions lower the cost of external
nance. Firms' net worth positions therefore determine their capacity to ob-
tain external funds and, as a consequence, their investment and production
levels.2
At the empirical level, the evidence on the role of nancial constraints for
investment decisions can be traced back to the original work of Fazzari et al.
(1988), who showed that the sensitivity of investment spending to nancial
positions is higher for rms a-priori considered likely to be credit constrained.
Subsequent studies have generally conrmed such ndings, extending the
analysis along a number of dimensions.3 In this literature, a positive and
signicant relationship between investment and liquidity indicators is taken
as evidence that rms are credit constrained, whereas perfect capital markets
would imply no such relation as internal and external nancing would be
perfect substitutes.
A similar approach has been followed to investigate the sensitivity of in-
vestment decisions to nancial positions in transition economies. However,
dierently from market economies, in transition economies the absence of a
positive and signicant relationship between investment and nancial indica-
tors is not likely to indicate perfect capital markets: it should rather suggest
2See e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). Other important theoretical works on the nancial propagation mechanism
include Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) and Gertler (1992).
3A number of articles have considered dierent data sets for the United States
(Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995), countries other than the U.S. (Chirinko and Schaller,
1995; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Hoshi et al., 1991; Blundell et al., 1992, alterna-
tive sample split criteria to identify credit constrained rms (Whited, 1992; Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1992, and alternative model specications (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard
et al., 1995). See also Hayashi and Inoue (1991); Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
4that rms are subject to a soft budget constraint, since they have access to
external nance irrespective of their protability. In other words, while for
western economies the null hypothesis in estimating cash 
ow-augmented in-
vestment equations is perfect capital markets, in the case of formerly planned
economies the null hypothesis is the presence of a soft budget constraint.
This approach has been followed in a number of recent papers that inves-
tigate investment decisions in transition economies. L zal and Svejnar (2002)
analyze rms' investment decisions in the Czech Republic between 1992 and
1998, nding that cooperatives and small rms are credit rationed, whereas
large state owned and private rms operate under a soft budget constraint.
Budina et al. (2000), who investigate the role of liquidity constraints for in-
vestment decisions of Bulgarian manufacturing rms in the 1993-1995 period,
nd that size and nancial structure help to determine the extent to which
rms are credit constrained and that soft-budget constraints continue to play
a major role.4
For the Hungarian economy, to our knowledge, there is no rm-level study
of investment decisions based on a large panel data set, with the only ex-
ception of Maurel (2001), who analyzes company accounts between 1992 and
1998, and nds that credit rationing applies to all categories of rms (foreign,
private and domestically owned). The focus of that study, however, is the role
of investment in improving the technical eciency of rms, as measured by
total factor productivity. Another work based on a large panel of Hungarian
rms is the one by Sgard (2001), who adds to the large body of literature on
foreign direct investment, nding that between 1992 and 1999 foreign equity
is associated with higher productivity levels and substantial positive spillover
eects on aggregate TFP growth. More recently, Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)
focus on the investment behaviour of 56 listed Hungarian rms.5
4Among related studies, Volchova (2003) estimates an accelerator model for Russian
industrial rms in 1996 and 1997, nding that rms in unregistered groups invest a larger
proportion of their retained earnings relative to the rest of the economy, while Bratkowski
et al. (2000), examine survey data for Czech, Hungarian and Polish newly established
private rms to assess the presence of credit constraints, and conclude that imperfections
in capital markets do not seem to restrain the growth of new private rms.
5Other important related studies for the Hungarian economy include Bonin and Schaer
(1995), who provide an assessment of the banking and bankruptcy reforms on the basis
of a survey of 200 manufacturing rms, and Halpern and K or osi (2000), who estimate
frontier production functions to investigate the impact of competition on the eciency
of the corporate sector. More recently, Csermely and Vincze (2003) and Colombo and
Revoltella (2003) examine the determinants of the capital structure of Hungarian rms,
5Against this background, our study contributes to the existing literature
on investment decisions in transition economies not only by lling the gap for
the Hungarian economy, but also by exploiting the richness of our rm-level
data set to explicitly address the eciency eect of nancial sector reforms
on state, private, and foreign enterprises. To this purpose, before presenting
the results of the empirical analysis, the next section brie
y reviews the
transformation of the Hungarian nancial sector, examining in particular
the banking sector reform and the bankruptcy law.
3 Financial sector reform in Hungary
One of the key elements of the reform of the Hungarian nancial system was
the restructuring of the banking sector. A two-tier banking system had been
already established in Hungary in 1987, when three state-owned banks had
taken over commercial functions from the National Bank of Hungary, which
retained central banking functions. Under the planned system, the monobank
did not operate on the basis of prot considerations, and its portfolio included
a high share of non-performing loans, which were inherited by the newly
established commercial banks. After 1990, new commercial banks entered
the market, even though foreign participation remained relatively low until
1994. The average quality of loans portfolio remained low, due to both the
absence of an appropriate regulatory framework to enforce prudential lending
practices, and the lack of expertise by bank managers, which often resulted
in bad lending decisions. The interplay of these factors resulted in a series of
banking crises in the early 1990s. The reaction of the Hungarian authorities
was twofold: at the banking level, a program of bank consolidation was
started in 1992; at rm level, a strict bankruptcy law was enacted to enforce
hard budget constraints on rms.
The consolidation program foresaw rst recapitalization and then priva-
tization of existing banks. As a result of recapitalization, the fraction of
bad loans started to decrease already in 1994, and since then it has steadily
declined reaching levels comparable to those of western economies. The pri-
vatization of banks took o between 1994 and 1995 with the government
selling strategic shares to foreign banks and other foreign investors. Over the
period 1994-2000 direct state ownership fell from 65 to less than 20 per cent,
nding evidence of imperfections that constrain rms in the achievement of their optimal
capital structure.
6while the share of foreign-owned banks rose from 20 to 80 per cent (see Abel
and Bonin, 2000).
It is largely agreed that the banking sector reform in Hungary has been
successful in establishing an ecient system of independent and nancially
strong commercial banks (see e.g. Halpern and Wyplosz, 1998, Stephan,
1999). A key factor of success was the outward-orientation of the reform,
with foreign banks being allowed not only to become shareholders of domestic
institutions, but also to establish their own subsidiaries. The presence of
foreign ownership had a positive spillover eect, increasing competition in
the sector, introducing innovative technologies and higher quality banking
services. More advanced banking skills enabled foreign rms to screen and
monitor loans more eectively, contributing signicantly to the reduction of
bad loans.
The new bankruptcy law was the second pillar of the legislative shock
therapy implemented in 1992. It established two possible tracks, liquidation
and reorganization, both of which allowed for the continuation of the rm
after restructuring.6 In addition, it imposed an automatic trigger that re-
quired a rm to le for reorganization if it was unable to repay any debt to
any creditor within 90 days of the debt becoming due. The motivation for
the strictness of the bankruptcy law and for the automatic trigger was the
concern by Hungarian authorities with two main problems: creditor passivity
and soft budget constraints.
The bankruptcy code was therefore engineered with the primary objective
to improve the state of payments discipline and to harden budget constraints,
especially through limitation of inter-enterprise debt arrears. However, the
emphasis on payment discipline created several distortions: Mitchell (1998)
and Bonin and Schaer (2002) point out that the automatic trigger was not
based on a measure of insolvency, but rather on a measure of illiquidity.
As a consequence, even protable and viable rms would be forced to enter
reorganization if they had overdue payables, independently of their amount.
Several authors (see e.g. Bonin and Schaer, 2002 have observed that the
severity and strictness of the bankruptcy law were excessive and represented
the primary cause of the credit crunch that hit the Hungarian economy dur-
6Despite the dierence in the denomination of the two tracks, in both cases the rm
was given the opportunity to reorganize and restructure. The actual dierence was that
under the reorganization track control remained with the incumbent management while
reorganization took place, whereas under the liquidation track control was transferred to
liquidators.
7ing 1992. In addition, it is ironic to note that while the bankruptcy law
identied two basic sources of soft budget constraints, commercial banks and
rms (in particular state-owned enterprises), recent studies show that the
primary source of soft budget constraints was the state itself since the ma-
jority of queued payables were represented by tax arrears and social security
payments. For all these reasons the bankruptcy law has been amended in late
1993, one of the most important changes being the abolition of the automatic
trigger.
4 Data
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on a large data set of
about 18,000 Hungarian rms from 1989 to 1999 (see appendix 1 for details).
The data set contains information on balance sheet and income statement
items, employment, export, ownership, regional location and industry classi-
cation at the four digit level. From the initial data set we selected compa-
nies whose main activity was in the manufacturing and construction sectors.
The resulting sample represents about 70 per cent and 35 per cent of total
employment in the manufacturing and construction sectors, respectively.
The main variables we use in the econometric analysis are investment
(I), capital (K), output (Y ), cash 






is dened as beginning-of-period net xed assets, and investment is inferred
from changes in net xed assets and depreciation charges. Cash 
ow is mea-
sured by adding depreciation to prots after interest, tax and preference
dividends. Net sales are used as a proxy for output. Leverage is measured by
the debt-asset ratio (non-equity assets over total assets). Information about
the distribution of equity ownership allows to identify separately state, pri-
vate domestic and foreign rms.
We applied a number of checks to account for possible data inconsisten-
cies. First, we eliminated companies with illogical gures, such as negative
sales, capital or employment. After computing the main variables, we also
eliminated companies for which any of the variables of interest fell in the
rst or last 2.5 percentile of its empirical distribution.7 We then excluded
companies with incomplete (discontinuous) time series and required that at
least four consecutive annual observations on each of the main variables were
7This check was necessary to control for the presence of outliers and the occurrence of
major mergers or acquisitions.
8available for the rms included in the nal sample. These criteria left us with
an unbalanced panel of 4333 rms for a total of about 25,000 observations
between 1989 and 1999.
Table 1 reports median values for the main variables used in the invest-
ment equations (investment, sales and cash-
ow relative to capital, plus lever-
age and employment) for the overall sample, and grouping rms according to
sample period (pre- and post-reforms), size, and leverage. For comparative
purposes, tables 2-4 present the same statistics by ownership type: state-
owned, private domestic and foreign-owned companies, representing about
41, 39 and 20 per cent of the sample, respectively.
Comparing the overall median values by ownership type, investment and
cash 
ow are lowest in state-owned rms (0.10 and 0.15) and highest in
foreign-owned rms (0.24 and 0.25). A similar pattern also applies to leverage
(0.41 and 0.46 for state and foreign-owned rms, respectively). The sales-
capital ratio is highest in private domestic rms (5.23) and lowest for foreign
rms (3.20). Finally, in the sample private domestic rms (which include
cooperatives) are generally smaller (the median employment is 71 against 80
for the whole sample).
Focusing on sub-samples within groups, we observe that investment, cash-

ow and leverage rise substantially in the 1994-99 sub-period, and this rise is
particularly evident for private domestic rms. Small rms (dened as rms
whose average employment is below the median for the whole sample) are
characterized by higher median values for all the indicators, both in the over-
all sample and by ownership type. The disaggregation by leverage (where
low- and high-leverage rms are dened as below- and above-median lever-
age) indicates that high-debt rms are characterized by higher investment
and sales, and lower employment levels.
5 Methodology
The relevance of nancial factors for corporate investment decisions is com-
monly investigated by adding nancial indicators, such as cash 
ow, to em-
pirical specications derived from a real investment model. The estimated
coecients for the nancial indicators are interpreted as a measure of the
sensitivity of investment to nancial constraints. In this paper we estimate

























where I is xed asset investment, K the beginning of period capital stock,
Y net sales and "i;t = i + 
t + i;t, where i represents rm-specic eects,

t time-specic eects, and i;t is the idiosyncratic component of the error
term.
Equation (1) re
ects rms' investment demand and implicitly assumes
perfectly elastic credit supply or, in the case of a transition economy, a soft
budget constraint. In order to account for the possibility that rms face
constraints in obtaining external nancing, we augment the basic equation
with lagged values of cash 

































In estimating the above equation, the presence of the lagged dependent
variable, which is correlated with the rm-specic component of the error
term, implies that the OLS estimator is inconsistent even if the idiosyncratic
component of the error term is serially uncorrelated. The within transfor-
mation, although eliminating the xed eects, does not solve the problem,
as it introduces correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
time averaged idiosyncratic error term (the same problem would apply to the
random eect-GLS estimator).
An alternative solution for the correlation with the xed eects is to
rst dierence the data. The eect of dierencing, however, is not only to
eliminate the individual eects, but also to produce a rst-order moving av-
erage error term. This, in turn, introduces correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the dierenced error term, thus posing the problem
of the selection of the instruments. To solve this problem, we follow the ap-
proach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) who developed a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that use lagged levels of variables as
instruments.
The advantage of the GMM estimator is that it optimally exploits all
the linear moment restrictions specied by the model. In particular, more
10lagged instruments become available for the dierenced equations as we con-
sider later cross-sections of the panel.8 As the number of valid instruments
depends on the serial correlation of the idiosyncratic component of the error
term, it is essential to verify the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors.
To this purpose, we report the m1 and m2 statistics, which test for rst and
second order serial correlation in the residuals. Both statistics are asymptot-
ically distributed as standard normal under the null of no serial correlation.
If the assumption of no autocorrelation for the errors in levels is correct, so
that second order lags of variables are valid instruments, the null hypothesis
should be rejected for m1 (because of the negative autocorrelation induced
by rst-dierencing) but not for m2. We also report p-values for the Sargan
test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 2 under
the null of instrument validity, where k is the number of over-identifying re-
strictions.9 We report one-step coecient estimates (see Arellano and Bond,
1991), and test statistics based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard er-
rors.
6 Results
Our empirical strategy consists in estimating the cash-
ow augmented accel-
erator model described in the previous section both for the overall sample of
rms and by ownership type. We start by examining the relationship between
cash-
ow and investment in the whole sample period. Next, we focus on how
this relationship changes across the pre-reform and post-reform periods, and
perform a number of robustness checks. Finally, in order to obtain a sharper
interpretation of the results, we explore within sub-periods dierences across
sub-samples of rms dened according to size and leverage.
Table 5 presents estimates of the basic accelerator investment equations
8In practice, very remote lags are unlikely to be informative instruments, and hence we
did not use all available moment restrictions. After some investigation we decided to use
instruments dated t   2 to t   6. All the results reported are qualitatively robust to the
choice of the instrument set.
9We also report the z1 statistic, a Wald test of joint signicance of the reported coe-
cients (asymptotically distributed as a 2
k under the null of no relationship, where k is the
number of coecients tested), and the z2 and z3 statistics, performing Wald tests of the
joint signicance of the coecients of the time and industry dummies, respectively. Esti-
mation was carried out using the DPD program (Arellano and Bond, 1988) with GAUSS
version 5.5.
11for the overall sample (column 2) and by ownership type (columns 3-5).
Concerning the model specication, the diagnostic statistics are generally
supportive of the validity of the instruments. In all equations, the m2 statistic
does not reject the hypothesis of no second order serial correlation, while the
m1 statistic shows signicant (negative) rst order serial correlation. Both
results are to be expected if the errors in levels are serially uncorrelated,
which is a necessary condition for t   2 lags to be valid instruments. In
addition, with the only exception of the equation for the overall sample, the
Sargan test does not reject the validity of the instruments used.
In the overall sample, lagged investment is positive and signicant, and
the coecients for sales are signicant and consistent with accelerator eects.
A similar pattern applies to the ownership sub-samples, with the exception
of the equation for state rms. It is interesting to observe that foreign rms
display the highest investment persistence, with a point estimate for the
lagged dependent variable (0.16) that is close to the ones observed for western
economies in similar specications (see e.g. Bond et al., 1997). Both sets
of dummies (industry- and year-specic) are jointly signicant in all the
equations.
The cash 
ow coecient is positive and signicant in the overall sample,
thus leading to reject the soft budget constraint null hypothesis. In the
equations by ownership, it is interesting to observe that the coecient for
cash 
ow is lowest and not signicant for state rms, whereas it is positive and
signicant for both private and foreign rms. These preliminary ndings are
therefore consistent with the hypothesis that, in the whole 1989-1999 period,
Hungarian state rms faced a soft budget constraint, whereas private and
foreign rms were subject to binding nancial constraints. This hypothesis,
however, deserves further investigation.
We therefore move to the analysis of how the investment behaviour of
rms has been aected by nancial reforms. We interact the cash-
ow vari-
able with a dummy variable (and its complement to 1) that equals 0 up to
(and including) 1993 and 1 thereafter, in order to compare the sensitivity of
rms' investment behaviour before and after nancial markets reforms. The
choice of 1993 as the cuto year has been made on the basis of a number
of reasons. First, even though the bankruptcy and banking laws were intro-
duced during 1992, a number of amendments were made during 1993, such
as the elimination of the automatic trigger in the bankruptcy law. Second,
it is reasonable to assume that the new regime displayed its eects only after
some time from the introduction of the new regulations. Third, the loan
12consolidation programs aimed at dealing with the bad debt problem were
implemented throughout 1992 and 1993 (see Bonin and Schaer, 1995). Fi-
nally, at the empirical level, 1993 is preferable to 1992 as cut-o year as it
produces sub-samples of similar size (5 and 6 year, respectively).10
The results for the pre- and post-reform sub-periods, presented in table 6,
are revealing. Looking at the overall sample, the cash 
ow coecient is close
to zero and not signicant in the pre-reform period, whereas it is larger and
highly signicant in the post-reform period. This nding seems to suggest
that nancial market reforms have indeed hardened budget constraints. The
disaggregation by ownership is also particularly informative. For both state
and private rms, the cash 
ow coecient is close to zero and not signicant
before 1993, but it rises substantially after 1993. However, only for private
rms the sensitivity of investment to nancial conditions becomes signicant
after 1993, whereas it is smaller and not signicant for state rms. For foreign
rms the picture is quite dierent: investment is signicantly aected by cash

ow both before and after 1993, but the coecient actually falls in the second
period.
On the whole, these results indicate that nancial reforms signicantly af-
fected the investment behaviour of all rms, but in dierent ways depending
on the ownership type. Private rms come to face binding nancial con-
straints in the post-reform period. State rms appear to keep facing a soft
budget constraint, although their investment decisions become more sensitive
to nancial conditions. Foreign rms are subject to a hard budget constraint
in both periods, but become less sensitive to nancial conditions, possibly
indicating that reforms might have been successful in lowering informational
costs.
In order to verify the validity of these results, we perform a number
of robustness checks. First, we consider the possibility that the changes
in cash 
ow coecients across sub-periods might be due to dierences in
sample size: the number of observations available in the two sub-periods is
indeed quite dierent, if we take into account the fact that two cross-sections
are lost at the beginning of the sample (1989-90) due to dierencing and
taking lags. We therefore consider an alternative denition of pre- and post-
reform periods, selecting 1995 as the threshold year. This implies that the
eective sub-periods contain 5 and 4 cross-sections, respectively. The results,
10It should be observed that, as shown below, the results reported are robust to the
choice of the cut-o year.
13presented in table 7, conrm and qualify those presented in table 6 for the
1993 sample-split: the cash 
ow coecient is not signicant throughout the
sample period for state rms, it rises signicantly after 1995 for private rms
and, for foreign rms, it falls over time and is actually signicant before 1995
but not signicant thereafter.11
A further robustness check is necessary in order to consider the possibility
that, due to the high turnover of rms in the overall sample, the dierences
in the estimated cash 
ow coecients before and after 1993 might actually
re
ect the dierent composition of the sub-samples. We therefore estimate
the investment equations on a balanced sample containing only rms that
are present throughout the 1989-1999 period. The results, presented in table
8, indicate that the eect of nancial liberalization on investment behaviour
is not spurious: cash 
ow coecients rise and become statistically signicant
in the post-reform period, both in the overall sample and in the ownership
disaggregation, with the only exception of foreign-owned rms.12
One potential problem with testing the role of nancial constraints using
liquidity indicators such as cash 
ow is that these variables may be capturing
the eect of other determinants, such as expectations about the protability
of investment projects, to the extent that they are not already captured by
sales. The solution generally adopted in the literature relies on rms' cross-
sectional heterogeneity, exploiting the fact that the sensitivity of investment
spending to changes in nancial positions should be higher for rms believed
to face signicant agency costs.13 Empirical studies of investment behaviour
thus typically split the sample into groups according to a number of cri-
teria considered a-priori to identify nancially constrained rms, including
dividend policy, age, size, industrial group, bond rating, stock listing, and
ownership structure.
11The results for private and foreign rms are consistent with those presented in table
3, given the dierent sub-sample denition: as 1994 and 1995 are now part of the pre-
reform period, cash 
ow becomes signicant in the rst sub-sample for private rms and
not signicant for foreign rms in the second sub-sample.
12It should be observed, however, that in the balanced sample the number of observations
for state and foreign rms is quite low (117 and 459, respectively), so that the results of
the corresponding equations should be interpreted with care.
13An alternative solution is to assume that investment opportunities are captured by
the Q ratio (see e.g. Blundell et al., 1992; Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Schaller, 1990).
However, apart from the practical consideration that the construction of Tobin's Q ratio
is substantially more data demanding, it is dicult to determine the extent an average
estimate of Q actually re
ects expected protabilty.
14We follow a similar approach in order to control for the possibility that
the dierent sensitivity of investment to cash 
ow before and after the re-
forms might be re
ecting a change in the unobserved determinants of invest-
ment demand, such as expected protability. We therefore present estimates
obtained with a further disaggregation, within the pre- and post-reform sub-
samples, according to rm size and solvency, respectively. Similarly to the
case of informational problems in market economies, size can be expected
to matter for budget constraints in a transition economy, as large rms are
more likely to face a soft budget constraint.14 Leverage, on the other hand,
is not expected to be related to the tightness of the budget constraint.15
The results for the disaggregation by size, presented in table 9, are quite
interesting: in the post-reform period cash 
ow is positive and signicant
only for small rms. Looking at the results by ownership type, cash 
ow
is signicant for small private rms and (marginally) for small state and
foreign rms. This indicates that the hardening of the budget constraint
following nancial market reforms only aected small private rms and, to
a lesser extent, small state rms. Large rms, on the contrary, were largely
unaected irrespective of their ownership type.
The results for the disaggregation by solvency (based on the debt-asset
ratio), presented in table 10, indicate that in the post-reform period the
sensitivity of investment to nancial conditions is higher and signicant for
low leverage rms. However, if we consider the equations by ownership,
the signicance of the estimated relationship is not related to leverage: in
the post-reform period cash 
ow does not aect investment levels of state
rms, whereas it does aect those of private and (marginally) foreign rms,
irrespective of their debt levels.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented an empirical investigation of the investment behaviour
of a large panel of Hungarian manufacturing rms between 1989 and 1999.
14\There is a peculiar disparity in the treatment of large and small state-owned rms.
[...] Large rms are much more successful in lobbying for favours, particularly for invest-
ment resources. Some of them are in great nancial trouble; nevertheless large credits or
subsidies are granted to them." (Kornai, 2000, p.29)
15The sample split is obtained by allowing the cash-
ow coecient to take dierent
values in the two sub-samples, by interacting it with the appropriate dummy variable.
15We examined the role of nancial factors for corporate investment decisions
before and after the introduction of major nancial reforms, and explored
dierences across sub-samples of rms dened according to size and leverage.
Our results indicate that nancial reforms have signicantly aected the
investment behaviour of all rms. The eects, however, were dierent de-
pending on rms ownership type. Both state-owned and domestic private
rms faced a soft-budget constraint before 1993. In the post-reform pe-
riod, while private rms came to face binding nancial constraints, state
rms remained subject to a soft budget constraint, although their invest-
ment decisions became more sensitive to nancial conditions. The response
of foreign-owned rms was quite dierent: they were subject to a hard budget
constraint in both periods, but became less sensitive to nancial conditions,
possibly indicating that reforms might have been successful in lowering in-
formational costs. These results were found to be robust to a number of
consistency checks.
Splitting the sample further by size and leverage, we found that after
1993 budget constraints have become binding for small private rms and, to
a lesser extent, small state rms. Large rms, on the contrary, continued to
face a soft budget constraint irrespective of their ownership type. The fact
that the post-1993 relationship between nancial conditions and investment
for Hungarian domestic rms depends on size but not on leverage can be
taken as a further indication that nancial reforms displayed their eects
through the hardening of the budget constraint for (small) private and state
rms.
Overall, our results for Hungarian manufacturing rms extend and qual-
ify those obtained by L zal and Svejnar (2002) for the Czech Republic and
by Budina et al. (2000) for Bulgaria. On the one hand, the persistent ab-
sence of liquidity constraints suggests that, despite the introduction of major
nancial reforms, large state-owned operated under a soft budget constraint
throughout the nineties.16 On the other hand, nancial reforms seem to have
signicantly improved the eciency of credit allocation to the private sec-
tor, in at least two respects: budget constraints became binding for private
domestic rms, particularly small ones, and informational costs became less
relevant for foreign-owned rms.
16This result questions the validity of the conclusion in Perotti and Vesnaver (2004),
based on a small sample of listed rms, that \state ownership does not alleviate capital
constraints and larger rms do not appear to be less constrained than the smaller rms,
which contrasts with the evidence in Western countries"
168 Appendix 1: The data set
The data set used in this paper contains company account data for a large
cross-section of Hungarian rms observed from 1989 to 1999. The data set
is based on two sources: a data set collected by the Hungarian Ministry of
Finance that contains information on all rms that paid corporate or prot
taxes from 1989 to 1996, covering the majority of Hungarian rms; and a
second data set from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce that contains
end of year nancial statements of medium-large rms, from 1992 to 1999.
Merging the information from the two sources we obtained rm-level annual
time series between 1989 and 1999 for balance sheet and income statement
variables, plus information on ownership, employment, export, regional lo-
cation and industry identication at the four digit level. Information about
the legal status and the distribution of equities among shareholders allowed
us to identify and quantify the presence of foreign ownership.17
The data set can be considered highly representative of the overall Hun-
garian economy. Table 11 provides some information on the sample coverage
by reporting total employment and value added in the sample as a percent-
age of the whole economy. The rms contained in the sample account for
over 70% and 80%, respectively, of total employment and value added in the
manufacturing sector. In other sectors such as agriculture and services the
degree of representativeness is lower, re
ecting the higher number of small
rms.
If we consider size representativeness, medium and large rms are over-
represented in the data set compared to the overall economy. As shown in
table 12, rms in the smallest size class (0-10 employees) account for over
two thirds of the total number of rms in the Hungarian economy, while
in our data set they account for only 13.6 per cent of the total. Looking
at the sectorial distribution of rms in the sample, table 13 shows that the
manufacturing sector is over represented (43 per cent, against 23.1 in the
whole economy).
17Firms are identied by their identication numbers. It should be observed that when
a rm is split, due to restructuring or privatization, a branch or a part of it normally keeps
the same identication number of the original rm, while a dierent identication number
is assigned to the other parts or branches. While the original rm and the branch that
keeps the same identication number are de facto dierent rms, in the sample they are
recorded as the same rm.
179 Appendix 2: The accelerator model
In the accelerator model, investment is determined by setting the marginal
product of capital equal to marginal cost. For a given technology, the opti-
mal level of the capital stock can be obtained, and investment lls the gap
between the optimal and current capital stock. Under a number of simpli-
fying assumptions, the demand for capital can be expressed as a function of
the level of output and the user cost of capital. Formally, the model can be












Kt+i = (1   )Kt+i 1 + It+i (4)
where  is the discount rate, p the price of output, K the capital stock,
L the labour input, w the wage rate, I is gross investment, pI the price of
investment goods, and  the rate of depreciation. The rst order condition
















where J is the user cost of capital, r the nominal rate of return and I the
in
ation rate for investment goods. Intuitively, at the optimum capital stock,
the marginal product of capital equals the cost of using an additional unit of
capital.
If the production function has constant elasticity of substitution (CES):
Yt = [K


















where  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This
gives the desired stock of capital as a function of sales and the user cost of
18capital. Investment decisions should be aimed at achieving this optimal level
of capital.









Under the further assumption that there is no substitution between cap-
ital and labor ( = 0), or that Jt is constant; then
K

t = Yt (10)
Investment is then given by
It = Yt   (1   )Kt 1 (11)
and dividing by Kt 1 we obtain the simple accelerator investment model,











This equilibrium relationship can be modied to account for gradual ad-






















(see e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988). To test for the presence of nancial constraints
this basic specication can be augmented with lagged cash-
ow (as a ratio
of the capital stock).
18Alternatively, it can be assumed that the variation in the user cost of capital is cap-
tured by time-specic or rm-specic eects in the error term.
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A E N. Obs.
Overall 0.15 4.32 0.20 0.43 79.64 25202
1989-93 0.10 4.34 0.16 0.40 65.50 9568
1994-99 0.18 4.30 0.23 0.44 86.50 15634
Small rms 0.19 5.79 0.27 0.47 44.13 12607
Large rms 0.13 3.50 0.16 0.39 184.57 12595
Low leverage 0.11 3.40 0.20 0.27 91.43 12606
High leverage 0.22 5.76 0.21 0.62 69.59 12596
Note: See section 4 for details on data sources and denitions of
variables. I =investment, K =capital, Y =sales; CF = cash-
ow
D = total debt, A = total assets, E = employment.








A E N. Obs.
Overall 0.10 4.16 0.15 0.41 80.00 10331
1989-93 0.08 4.83 0.16 0.42 44.50 6195
1994-99 0.13 3.36 0.15 0.40 132.42 4136
Small rms 0.14 6.56 0.25 0.44 30.50 5177
Large rms 0.08 3.13 0.11 0.39 251.00 5154
Low leverage 0.08 3.20 0.16 0.26 92.20 5166
High leverage 0.14 5.68 0.15 0.62 67.40 5165
Note: See section 4 for details on data sources and denitions of
variables. I =investment, K =capital, Y =sales; CF = cash-
ow
D = total debt, A = total assets, E = employment.








A E N. Obs.
Overall 0.16 5.23 0.23 0.43 71.09 9949
1989-93 0.10 4.22 0.17 0.33 83.75 2577
1994-99 0.18 5.63 0.26 0.46 66.06 7372
Small rms 0.22 6.39 0.29 0.50 46.63 4985
Large rms 0.11 4.47 0.19 0.36 123.88 4964
Low leverage 0.09 4.03 0.20 0.26 84.73 4980
High leverage 0.27 7.07 0.27 0.64 60.67 4969
Note: See section 4 for details on data sources and denitions of
variables. I =investment, K =capital, Y =sales; CF = cash-
ow
D = total debt, A = total assets, E = employment.








A E N. Obs.
Overall 0.24 3.20 0.25 0.46 109.14 4922
1989-93 0.25 2.67 0.17 0.43 112.20 796
1994-99 0.24 3.29 0.27 0.46 108.14 4126
Small rms 0.25 3.33 0.27 0.47 58.50 2464
Large rms 0.24 3.09 0.24 0.45 261.50 2458
Low leverage 0.21 2.76 0.29 0.33 111.25 2465
High leverage 0.27 3.91 0.21 0.61 102.38 2457
Note: See section 4 for details on data sources and denitions of
variables. I =investment, K =capital, Y =sales; CF = cash-
ow
D = total debt, A = total assets, E = employment.
25Table 5: Investment equations: overall




i;t 1 0.10 -0.01 0.13 0.16




i;t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01




i;t 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02




i;t 1 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04
( 3.41) ( 0.24) ( 4.16) ( 2.78)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.68 0.87 0.81 0.82
Sargan test 0.00 0.38 0.12 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
N. obs. 16536 5893 7167 3476
Note: Dependent variable: I
K. GMM one-step estimates in rst




Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in
round brackets (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors).
In the bottom part of the table p-values reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 4333.
26Table 6: Investment equations: pre-post 1993




i;t 1 0.09 -0.02 0.12 0.16




i;t -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01




i;t 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01




i;t 1 pre-93 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06




i;t 1 post-93 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
( 6.61) ( 1.94) ( 4.94) ( 2.53)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.59 0.84 0.69 0.81
Sargan test 0.00 0.42 0.24 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
N. obs. 16536 5893 7167 3476
Note: Dependent variable: I
K. GMM one-step estimates in rst




where the latter is also interacted with the relevant dummy variables.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in
round brackets (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors).
In the bottom part of the table p-values reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 4333.
27Table 7: Investment equations: pre-post 1995




i;t 1 0.10 -0.01 0.13 0.16




i;t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01




i;t 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01




i;t 1 pre-95 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07




i;t 1 post-95 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03
( 5.04) ( 1.29) ( 4.22) ( 1.71)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.73 0.85 0.84 0.71
Sargan test 0.00 0.39 0.15 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
N. obs. 16536 5893 7167 3476
Note: Dependent variable: I
K. GMM one-step estimates in rst




Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in
round brackets (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors).
In the bottom part of the table p-values reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 4333.
28Table 8: Investment equations: pre-post reforms (balanced sample)




i;t 1 0.03 -0.23 0.00 0.16




i;t 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01




i;t 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02




i;t 1 low pre-93 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01




i;t 1 high post-93 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.05
( 5.24) ( 3.39) ( 3.87) ( 1.47)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.16 0.19 0.42 0.76
Sargan test 0.64 0.94 0.45 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.11
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N. obs. 2403.00 117.00 1827.00 459.00
Note: Dependent variable: ( I
K)i;t. GMM estimates in rst dierences,
using (t   2;t   3) lags of I
K, Y
K, CF
K as instruments, where the latter
is also interacted with the relevant dummy variables.
Year and industry dummies are included in all equations.
t-statistics reported in parentheses (robust standard errors). In the
bottom part of the table p-values are reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 267.
29Table 9: Investment equations: large-small




i;t 1 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.16




i;t -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01




i;t 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01




i;t 1 pre-93 large -0.11 -0.28 -0.06 0.12




i;t 1 pre-93 small 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03




i;t 1 post-93 large 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01




i;t 1 post-93 small 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05
( 2.09) ( 1.82) ( 3.24) ( 1.77)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.01 0.25 0.68 0.80
Sargan test 0.02 0.85 0.43 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
N. obs. 16536 5893 7167 3476
Note: Dependent variable: I
K. GMM one-step estimates in rst




where the latter is also interacted with the relevant dummy variables.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in
round brackets (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors).
In the bottom part of the table p-values reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 4333.
30Table 10: Investment equations: low-high debt




i;t 1 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.14




i;t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01




i;t 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01




i;t 1 pre-93 low debt 0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.03




i;t 1 pre-93 high debt -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09




i;t 1 post-93 low debt 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.07




i;t 1 post-93 high debt 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04
( 1.34) ( 0.99) ( 2.48) ( 1.87)
m1 (1st order autoc.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 (2nd order autoc.) 0.47 0.58 0.34 0.83
Sargan test 0.00 0.79 0.30 1.00
z1 (overall) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
z2 (time dummies) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
z3 (ind. dummies) 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.00
N. obs. 16536 5893 7167 3476
Note: Dependent variable: I
K. GMM one-step estimates in rst




where the latter is also interacted with the relevant dummy variables.
Year and industry dummies included in all equations. t-statistics in
round brackets (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors).
In the bottom part of the table p-values reported for the test statistics.
Sample period: 1991 to 1999. Overall number of rms: 4333.
31Table 11: Sample coverage




Electricity, Gas, Water 93.8 97.0
Construction 36.1 34.3
Trade, Tourism 35.8 40.3
Transport 72.1 58.9
Finance 29.8 9.4
Public Administration 4.3 4.7
Note: Total employment and value added in the sample as a percentage
of the Hungarian economy (1995).
Table 12: Sample representativeness by size






Note: Distribution of employment by employment size class (1995).
32Table 13: Sample representativeness by sector




Electricity, Gas, Water 6.3 2.6
Construction 5.4 5.9
Trade, Tourism 14.2 15.6
Transport 15.9 8.7
Finance 4.4 6.0
Public Administration 2.2 29.2
Note: Distribution of employment by sector (1995).
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